We study two logics of knowledge and belief stemming from the work of Stalnaker (2006) , omitting positive introspection for knowledge. The two systems are equivalent with positive introspection, but not without. We show that while the logic of beliefs remains unaffected by omitting introspection for knowledge in one system, it brings significant changes to the other. The resulting logic of belief is non-normal, and its complete axiomatization uses an infinite hierarchy of coherence constraints. We conclude by returning to the philosophical interpretation underlying both models of belief, showing that neither is strong enough to support a probabilistic interpretation, nor an interpretation in terms of certainty or the "mental component" of knowledge.
The 1 starting point of this paper is the logic of knowledge and belief proposed by Robert Stalnaker in Stalnaker (2006) , and recently studied further in Özgün (2013) and Baltag et al. (2013) . In this system the only purely doxastic axiom is D. All other core principles for the logic of belief-K, 4, and 5-are theorems instead of axioms. They follow from a number of principles regimenting the interaction between knowledge and belief (see Table 2 ) together with the axioms for knowledge. Belief, furthermore, becomes definable in terms of the knowledge modality in that logic. An agent believes ϕ if and only if it is consistent with that agent's information that she knows ϕ.
In this paper we study the logic of belief that results from omitting positive introspection for knowledge in Stalnaker's system. While he explicitly rejects negative introspection, Stalnaker "provisionally" accepts that knowing implies knowing that one knows (Stalnaker 2006, p.173) . This principle, however, has been the subject of much discussion, starting with Hintikka's (1962) . See Hendricks (2003) for an overview of the classical points of contention. In recent years Williamson's (2000, chap. 5 ) charge against the so-called "KK-principle" has attracted much attention. Williamson argues that if knowledge comes with a margin of error then assuming positive introspection leads to paradoxes. We do not take sides in this debate here. Rather, we investigate the logical question of what happens to the logic of belief in Stalnaker's system when knowledge is not introspective. This paper is thus primarily aimed at epistemic logicians. It helps chart the landscape of combined epistemic and doxastic systems when knowledge is not positively introspective, viz. when the epistemic logic does not contain the 4 axiom. This complements Wolgang Lenzen's early work on epistemic-doxastic logics, in which knowledge is between S4 and S5 (Lenzen 1979) . We offer a number of new completeness results together with a discussion of the interpretation of the resulting belief operators.
Section 1 presents Stalnaker's original system and some of its salient properties. It turns out that omitting positive introspection from that system gives rise to two rather different logics of beliefs. We present one at the end of Sect. 1, while the other is covered in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3 we ask whether this resulting belief operator can be supported by a probabilistic interpretation, and answer in the negative. Section 4 concludes by casting doubt on whether this belief operator can instead be read as "subjective certainty" or the "mental component" of knowledge.
Stalnaker's original system
In this section we review Stalnaker's original proposal. The presentation consolidates a number of known (Stalnaker 2006; Özgün 2013; Baltag et al. 2013) and new results about that system. In the Appendix of this paper we also provide a cut-free display calculus for it. one could interpret that operator, and thereby the axiom SB, by using the notions of absolute certainty or even the mental component of knowledge. The relation between knowledge and belief in this system turns out to be subtle, though, especially when knowledge is not positively introspective. So, for now, we leave the discussion of the interpretation of the belief operator under the Stalnaker axioms at that. We shall return to it in Sects. 3 and 4.
Write S for the logic consisting of axioms and rule of Tables 1 and 2 , together with all propositional tautologies. Call the belief fragment L B of L the set of all formulas in L that do not contain the K modality. The belief fragment of the logic S is defined as S ∩ L B .
Observation 1 [cf. Stalnaker (2006) ] For all ϕ ∈ L B :
This result does not need positive introspection for knowledge. This will be seen to be important later. We sketch the proof here.
Proof of Observation 1
We show how to derive D, 4 and 5 for the belief operator, i.e. the formulas Bϕ → B ϕ (D), Bϕ → B Bϕ (4) and ¬Bϕ → B¬Bϕ (5). D is an axiom, and 4 and 5 follow directly from PI and NI, together with KB. Indeed, for 4, starting from Bϕ one gets K Bϕ by one application of PI, and then B Bϕ follows from KB. The argument for 5 is completely analogous.
The proof of normality of B in that logic, i.e. that it admits the K axiom and the necessitation rule, is facilitated by what is probably the most crucial theorem of that logic:
Observation 2 [cf. Stalnaker (2006) ] S E Q In this logic, believing is equivalent to the epistemic possibility of knowledge, i.e. one believes ϕ exactly when one's current knowledge is consistent with knowing ϕ. The derivation of (EQ) notably does not involve positive introspection for knowledge. Again, this will be important later, so again we sketch the proof here.
Proof of Observation 2
Assuming that Bϕ holds, we start by invoking SB to get B K ϕ. From there, we arrive at B K ϕ and finally at K K ϕ using D and KB, in that order. For the other direction, we start by assuming K K ϕ. We can derive K Bϕ using KB and the fact that K is a normal modality. One application of NI then gives us Bϕ.
With this in hand we can return to the argument for the normality of B. For NEC, assuming that ϕ is a theorem, NEC for K gives us that K ϕ is also a theorem. From there, one application of the T axiom for K and modus ponens entails that K K ϕ, and hence that Bϕ is a theorem too. Now, it is well known that in the presence of NEC the K axiom is provably equivalent to distribution over conjunction:
The left-to-right implication follows straightforwardly from the fact that K is normal.
The right-to-left direction is also well known and was already noted by Stalnaker.
Here, however, we present a proof of it that is, to our knowledge, new and, more importantly, that does not make use of positive introspection for knowledge.
Proof All the steps use normality of K . We first show that:
And then we show that:
This finishes the proof of Observation 1. Again, the notable feature of this proof is that it nowhere uses positive introspection for knowledge. So, even if knowledge is not introspective, which in Stalnaker's system boils down for it to be a KT modality, the logic of belief in S is still at least KD45. Again, this will be important later. For now, however, we can show more, namely that the logic of belief in Stalnaker's system is exactly KD45.
Observation 4 For all ϕ ∈ L B :

S ϕ if and only if K D45 ϕ
Proof The right-to-left direction is Observation 1. For the left-to-right direction, assume that K D45 ϕ. We have to show that S ϕ. Since K D45 ϕ, there is a maximally KD45-consistent set ⊆ L B with ¬ϕ ∈ . We shall show that is in fact already a S-consistent set. To this end, define K ψ as Bψ ∧ ψ. We have to show that together with this newly defined K operator is S consistent, i.e. that it is S4 and satisfies the interaction axioms of Table 2 . Normality of K follows from normality of B. The T axiom for K as well as Stalnaker's K B follow immediately from the definition of K . Further, note that Bψ implies B Bψ by KD45 for B and these two together imply B(Bψ ∧ ψ), using normality once again. But this exactly means that Bψ → B K ψ, which is the S B axiom. Further, by the same derivation, we find that
e. the 4-axiom. Further, using positive introspection, we obtain Bψ → B Bψ ∧ Bψ. The consequent is by definition equivalent to K Bψ, thus proving P I . Finally, using 5 for B, we find that ¬Bψ → B¬Bψ ∧ ¬Bψ. Again the consequent is by definition equivalent to K ¬Bψ, proving N I . Thus, is also a maximally S-consistent set. Since ¬ϕ ∈ S, this implies that S ϕ.
Furthermore, three more minor facts are worth noting regarding Stalnaker's system. First, PI is redundant in that system. Write S −P I for Stalnaker's system minus PI.
Observation 5 For all formulas ϕ ∈ L,
S ϕ if and only if S −P I ϕ
Proof We have to show that S −P I P I . First, we note that the proof of S (EQ) did not rely on P I . Thus, S −P I E Q. Having this, we can show P I . From Bϕ, that is from K K ϕ by (EQ), one application of SB gives K K K ϕ, and one application of D gives K K K ϕ, which is just K Bϕ.
Furthermore, it should be clear that Stalnaker's system is not a conservative extension of S4 for the knowledge modality. A simple illustration of that is that in the presence of (EQ), D for belief translates into the .2 axiom for knowledge,
which is of course not a theorem of S4 alone.
On the other hand, if we augment S4 with .2 and the equivalence (EQ), then we retrieve Stalnaker's system S. More precisely: Define S4.2 + E Q as the logic S4.2 for knowledge augmented with (EQ), here taken as an axiom. Observe that the latter is the only principle for belief in this logic.
Observation 6 [cf. Özgün (2013) ] For all formulas ϕ:
Again, the proof of this result will be important later, this time because it does make use of positive introspection for knowledge.
Proof We have already shown that S4.2 + E Q ⊆ S, since the latter contains S4 and derives (EQ), from which we obtain .2 for K. For the converse, it suffices to show that the axioms of Table 2 are theorems of S4.2 + E Q. Again, with (EQ), D is just .2 under another guise, and KB is a direct consequence of T for knowledge. SB is derived by one application of 4 to K K ϕ. As shown above, PI follows from that by one application of .2. We get NI in contrapositive by one application of 4 to K K K ϕ.
The proof of Observation 4 might seem to suggest that, in Stalnaker's system, knowledge is the same as true belief. This does not hold true in general.
Observation 7
Proof The left-to-right implication always holds, as it follows from K B and the T axiom. We show that the reverse direction does not hold in general by means of a counterexample. Figure 1 displays a model for a S4.2 knowledge relation, i.e. the relation is reflexive, transitive and satisfies the Church-Rosser property. By defining Bϕ as K K ϕ, this model becomes a S-model (cf. Observation 6), i.e. a model of Stalnaker's original axioms as shown in Tables 1 and 2 
Let us take stock. We have now two ways to build a logic of belief on top of S4 for knowledge. The first is by Stalnaker's axioms in Table 2 , and the resulting logic is S. The second is by adding .2 for knowledge and (EQ), to get S4.2 + EQ. The two are provably equivalent, see Observation 6. So we are in fact dealing with one logical system, whose belief fragment we otherwise know to be exactly KD45.
Stalnaker's axioms with non-introspective knowledge
Let us now go back to the main question of this paper: to pinpoint the consequences, for the logic of belief, of omitting 4 for knowledge. Let us formulate this more precisely. Let S −4 be exactly as S except that the logic of knowledge is KT instead of S4. Define KT.2 + EQ analogously. The question we are asking, then, is what is the logic of belief in S −4 and KT.2 + EQ?
The answer for S −4 is already at hand. The proof of Observation 1 shows that K, NEC, 4 and 5 for B are all still derivable in S −4 , and so is (EQ). This means:
S −4 ϕ if and only if K D45 ϕ Proof We have just argued that K D45 ϕ implies S −4 ϕ. Since S −4 is a fragment of S, this implies in turn S ϕ. But we know by Observation 4 that the latter happens if and only if K D45 ϕ.
So we already know the answer to our first question, namely what happens to the logic of belief when we omit positive introspection for knowledge in Stalnaker's system? To put it bluntly, the answer is: nothing. Omitting positive introspection for knowledge in Stalnaker's leaves the logic of belief intact. Of course, this is not the case for knowledge. S −4 is a non-conservative extension of KT, and K ϕ → K K ϕ is not valid in that system. This can be illustrated by the following model of S −4 where knowledge is not introspective.
So while omitting 4 from S yields a genuinely different logic of knowledge, this does not affect the belief fragment. Is that also the case for KT.2 + EQ? That 4 is used three times in the proof of Observation 6 suggests that the answer is no. This is indeed the case, as we show in the next section.
KT.and belief as epistemic possibility of knowledge
In this section we will turn to the logic of belief when it is defined as the epistemic possibility of knowledge, as in (EQ). We start with an epistemic logic where K is a KT.2 modality. The only axiom for the belief modality is (EQ). In other words, all and only the logical properties of belief are those inherited from its reduction to K K . The question we ask can be then reformulated as follows: what is the sound and complete logic of the K K fragment of KT.2?
We have seen in the previous section that if knowledge is S4.2 then this logic of belief is equivalent to the one resulting from Stalnaker's axiom, and that it is completely axiomatized by KD45. This equivalence fails if the logic of knowledge is weakened to KT.2 . This is what we show first, by arguing that the resulting logic of belief is not normal. For this we will use semantic tools, which we introduce in Sect. 2.1. We then move to a complete axiomatization of the logic of belief, in Sect. 2.2. Definition 1 An epistemic frame F is a pair W, R where W is a set of states and R is a reflexive, binary relation satisfying, for all w, x, y ∈ W :
• (Church-Rosser) If w Rx and w Ry then there is a z such that x Rz and y Rz.
An epistemic model M is an epistemic frame together with a valuation V assigning subsets of W to each atomic proposition in Prop.
The truth condition for epistemic formulas thus becomes:
It is well known that the logic KT.2 is sound and complete with respect to the class of epistemic frames. Now define Bϕ as K K ϕ. This belief operator is not normal. The right-to-left direction of distribution under conjunction for beliefs, that is Dist-∧ fails. Figure 2 illustrates this with a simple counter-example. This model displays the epistemic relation R. At w 1 we have both K K p and K K q but not K K ( p ∧ q), thus belief is not normal.
This belief operator otherwise validates necessitation and the left-to-right direction of Dist-∧. The latter can be encapsulated using the standard regularity rule (Chellas 1980; Pacuit 2016) . Definition 2 A MUD neighborhood frame F N , or MUD frame for short, is a pair W, n , where W is a set of possible worlds and n : W → P(P(W )) is a neighborhood function, satisfying the following conditions:
A MUD model M is a neighborhood frame augmented with a valuation function V , as above.
MUD models are used to interpret the belief operator only. Given a MUD model M, we write ϕ M for the truth set of ϕ in M, that is the set {w : M, w ϕ}. The truth condition for B is the standard one for neighborhood structures.
M, w Bϕ iff ϕ ∈ n(w)
It is again well known that NEC, REG and D are together sound and complete with respect to the class of MUD frames. This logic, however, is sound but not complete for the belief fragment of KT.2. Let the formula (NBM), standing for No Belief in Moore sentence, be defined as follows:
We will offer some interpretation of (NBM) soon. First, we show that (NBM) differentiates the two systems KT.2 and NEC, REG, and D.
Observation 10
Proof For proving the first claim, start with the following theorem of KT:
One application of necessitation gives us the required formula, using (EQ):
It is easy to construct a counter-model to the validity of that formula in MUD frames.
We now return to the interpretation of (NBM). This formula is equivalent to
and the formula p ∧ ¬Bp in the scope of the outermost belief operator is, of course, the classical "Moore sentence." The logic KT.2 thus precludes the agent from believing such a sentence about herself. This is a second-order coherence condition on belief in KT.2. Observe, however, that the stronger conditions of positive and negative introspection both fail for belief in this logic. Counter-examples are easy to construct. So, even though beliefs are not fully transparent, they are nonetheless subject to higherorder coherence constraints such as (NBM). NEC, REG and D, however, capture the full structure of first-order belief, i.e. a non-embedded belief fragment, as we will show at the end of the next section. These axioms and rules are sound and complete for the class of L B formulas of modal depth at most one. But the full belief fragment is more demanding, as we shall see presently.
Beyond MUD: completeness
The formula (NBM) does not yet suffice to completely characterize the belief fragment of KT. 2 + EQ. We need to strengthen this condition to interact with other beliefs held by the agent. This strengthening turns out to be a set of non-trivial, infinitary constraints that lives at the frontier of expressive power for our language. So before we give a precise definition we present some intuitions guiding the construction.
The condition we need is encapsulated syntactically by the following sequence of formulas using infinite conjunction over L B . We will show this in Lemma 2 below.
The first conjunct is a theorem of KT. 2 + EQ. The second conjunct is exactly the condition expressed by taking all instances of (NBM). Since B 1 ψ → B 1 , the B 1 ψ are thus a stronger version of the "no Moore sentence" condition. B 1 ψ can best be interpreted in terms of a stability condition. While the usual ϕ ∧ ¬Bϕ states that ϕ is true, yet the agent does not believe it, the condition ϕ ∧ ¬ (ψ ∧ Bϕ) states that ϕ is true, yet whenever ψ holds, the agent does not believe that ϕ. This condition thus relativizes the classical Moore sentence to those cases where ψ is true. With this in mind, B 1 ψ can be read as stating that the agent believes ψ and even if we deleted all ¬ψ worlds, the agent would still not believe any Moore sentence about herself. In other words, the agent's belief in ψ is fully compatible with her believing a no-Moore condition.
The formulas B i ψ then are higher-order equivalents of this ψ no-Moore condition. In fact, the formulas B n ψ form an increasing hierarchy of conditions; that is, we have B n ψ → B n−1 ψ for all n. As it will turn out, the B i are central for characterizing the belief fragment of K T.2 + E Q. We will see below that validity of the B i is necessary and sufficient for representing any MUD-models as KT.2 Kripke models (Lemma 2). We thus define:
Fortunately, though, in order to completely axiomatize the belief fragment of KT. 2 + EQ we do not need to write down all the B i explicitly. We can work with finite approximations. This is what we show now.
To begin with, let us define sets of sets of L B formulas X ψ i for i ≥ 1 and ψ ∈ L. The construction is by induction over i. For the base case i = 1 and ψ ∈ L B , let
We then define X ψ 1 as the set of all finite conjunctions of formulas from X ψ 1 . Similarly, for i > 1, we define A central role in our axiomatization is played by the X i . In fact, it is sufficient to look at these X i , i.e. the finitary counterparts of the formulas of the form B i , which are in turn the classical, non-relativized no-Moore condition and their higher order variant. These B i are all sound with respect to the belief fragment of KT. 2 + EQ, and so are the X i . In fact, within KT. 2 + EQ, the entire hierarchy of X ψ i is situated between knowledge and belief. This is in fact true for infinitary formulas B i ϕ as well. However, showing this would require us to enter the proof theory of infinitary languages in more detail. So we leave this aside for now.
Observation 11
For all i ≥ 1 and χ ∈ X ψ i :
Proof The only thing to be shown is the first implication. We prove this by induction over i. We start with i = 1. Assume K ψ. We thus have to derive any formula χ in X ψ 1 . Without loss of generality, it suffices to limit our attention to χ ∈ X ψ 1 . By (EQ), we thus have to show, for an arbitrary ϕ ∈ L B , that
First, we note that the first conjunct holds. Indeed, applying the T axiom, we have K ψ → K K ψ, i.e. K ψ → Bψ, taking care of the first conjunct. It thus remains to show that K ψ implies the second conjunct. We show the contrapositive. Assume that
, is inconsistent with K ϕ → Bϕ, which we have derived above. Thus the first disjunct K (K ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) is true. But this implies K ¬ψ, and hence ¬K ψ. This contradicts our induction assumption of K ψ, thus deriving the desired contradiction. The proof of the induction step from i to i + 1 is similar to the above proof, with all Bψ replaced by χ ∈ X ψ i and Bϕ replaced by χ ∈ X ϕ i .
Corollary 1 K T.2+E Q χ for all χ ∈ X i and i ∈ ω.
The axiom and rules D, NEC and REG as well as all elements of X i for all i are thus sound with respect to the belief fragment of KT. 2 + EQ. In the following, we will denote this infinite set of axioms by MUD +X . Is MUD +X also complete with respect to the belief fragment of KT. 2 + EQ? Yes.
Theorem 1
The system MUD +X is a sound and complete axiomatization for the belief part of KT. 2 + EQ In order to show completeness, we will need two auxiliary results. The first one shows that counter-models in MUD ∞ frames can be constructed for each non-theorem of MUD +X . The second is the key representation theorem, showing that any MUD ∞ -model can be turned into a KT.2 model. These two together give us completeness.
Lemma 1 Let ϕ such that MUD +X ϕ. Then there is a MUD ∞ model in which M ϕ
Proof We start with constructing a canonical model M = W, n, V of MUD +X . As usual, the set of worlds W of M is the set of all maximally MUD +X consistent subsets of L B . First, we note that W is not empty, as MUD +X is sound with respect to the class of all KT.2 models, as shown in Corollary 1. Define the neighborhood function of M as n(w) := {{v|ϕ ∈ v}|Bϕ ∈ w} and close all neighborhoods under supersets. As usual, the atomic valuation is given by w ∈ V ( p) iff p ∈ w. We have to show that
We do so by induction over the complexity of ϕ. The atomic and Boolean case work as usual. We only show the case where ϕ is of the form Bψ. For the right-to-left direction, assume that ϕ = Bψ ∈ w. By construction, {v|ψ ∈ v} ∈ n(w). By induction hypothesis, we have that {v|ψ ∈ v} = {v|M, v ψ}, thus also the latter is in n(w). Therefore M, w Bψ, which completes the proof. For the reverse direction, assume that ϕ = Bψ / ∈ w. Again, by induction hypothesis it suffices to show that {v|M, v ψ} / ∈ n(w). We thus need to show for all Y ∈ n(w) that there is some y ∈ Y with M, y ¬ψ. Let an arbitrary Y ∈ n(w) be given. By construction of the n(w), there is some Bχ ∈ w with Y ⊇ {v|χ ∈ v}. First, we show that MUD +X χ → ψ: If not, MUD +X χ → ψ holds, which together with Bχ ∈ w and REG implies that Bψ ∈ w, contradicting the assumption that Bψ / ∈ w. Thus MUD +X χ → ψ, and hence there is some maximally MUD +X consistent set y with χ ∈ y and ψ / ∈ y. In particular y ∈ Y , but, by induction hypothesis, M, y ψ, finishing the proof that {v|M, v ψ} / ∈ n(w). Now we proceed by showing that M is not just a MUD +X , but also a MUD ∞ -model, i.e. that all B i are valid on M. By construction, all X i are valid on M. We show by induction on i that M, w
The left to right direction is automatic. For the right to left direction the basic case, i = 1, is also straightforward. So assume now that M, w X
Thus, it suffices to show that this formula also holds for all ϕ ∈ L B with Bϕ ∈ w. Let such ϕ be given. By assumption, we have for all 
Since the n(w) are upward closed, the n i (w) are as well. Also, since n i (w) ⊆ n(w), X ∩ Y = ∅ for all X, Y ∈ n i (w) (since the same holds true for n(w)). Furthermore we show that the neighborhoods n i interpret the operators B i in the following sense:
We show this by an induction over i. For i = 0, the claim is obviously true. Now assume the claim holds for i − 1, we show that it holds for i. First, assume that B i ϕ holds at v. We have to show that ϕ ∈ n i (v) . By definition ofn(v), it suffices to show for all ψ ∈ L B with ψ ∈ n(v) that there is some x ∈ ϕ ∩ ψ with ψ ∈ n i−1 (x). By definition, our assumption
Thus, whenever ψ ∈ n(v), there is some x ∈ ψ with M, x ϕ ∧ B i−1 ψ. In particular, x ∈ ψ ∩ ϕ and by induction hypothesis also ψ ∈ n i−1 (x), since M, w B i−1 ψ. This finishes the proof of the first direction. For the reverse direction, Fig. 3 The construction of N as a layered model (all reflexive arrows missing) assume that ϕ ∈ n i (v) . We have to show that M,
Assume for a contradiction that X ∈ n(v). Thus X ∈n(v) and, since ϕ ∈ n i (v), there is some x ∈ ϕ ∩ X with X ∈ n i−1 (x). Since ψ ⊇ X , this implies that ψ ∈ n i−1 (x). But by induction, this implies that M, x ϕ ∧ B i−1 ψ, contradicting the assumption that x ∈ X . Now we can start proving (1). Assume, that B 2d is valid in M (i.e. M, v B 2d for all v ∈ W M ). Since B 2d → B i for all i ≤ 2d, we have that all neighborhoods n i (v) for v ∈ W M and i ≤ 2d are non-empty. We now construct an epistemic model N , v. We start by constructing the set of worlds W N of N . The set W N will be divided into different layers, L 0 , . . . , L 2d+1 , which are constructed inductively. This construction is pictured in Fig. 3 . Each world v ∈ L i will be indexed with a pair {x, X } with x ∈ W M and X ⊆ W M such that X ∈ n 2d−i (x). The inductive construction of the L i is as follows: For the first layer, L 0 , pick any X ∈ n 2d (w). Layer L 0 , then contains a single world v w,X . Now, assume that L i−1 is already constructed for some i < 2d. To construct L i , we execute the following steps for each v x,X in L i−1 . By assumption, X ∈ n 2d−(i−1) (x). Thus, we have that for every Y ∈n(x), there is r ∈ X ∩ Y with Y ∈ n 2d−i (r ). . Thus, using the fact that n(x) is upwards closed, we have that ψ M ∈ n(x), completing the proof.
The proof of (2) is similar to the proof of (1). We only sketch the argument. This time, the set of worlds of N consists of an infinite hierarchy of layers L 0 , L 1 , . . .. The individual worlds v ∈ W N will be labeled with triples v x,X,n , where x ∈ W M , X ∈ n(x) and n ∈ ω. To construct layer L 0 , we pick some X ∈ n i (w) (which is non-empty, as W M ∈ n i (w) for all i) and set L 0 = {v w,X,0 }. Second, to construct L 1 , for every Y ∈n(w) and every j ∈ ω pick some r ∈ X with Y ∈ n j (r ). Add a new world to L 1 with label x v,Y, j . Further add v r,W M , j for every r ∈ X and j ∈ ω to L 1 . From there on, the inductive procedure goes as usual: For i > 0 assume that L i is already constructed. For every v x,X, j ∈ L i with j > 1 and every Y ∈n(x) pick some y ∈ X ∩ Y with Y ∈ n j−1 (y) and add v y,Y, j−1 to L i+1 . Also add v x,W M ,l for all x ∈ X and l ∈ ω to L i+1 . The valuation V N is defined as above. The relation R is defined as follows: Relate every x ∈ W N to itself and relate the unique element of L 0 to all elements of L 1 .
with y ∈ X . Also relate v x,X, j ∈ L i to all v y,W M ,l for l ≥ j − 1 and y ∈ X . Then the proof that N is an epistemic model proceeds as above.
We still have to show that this new pointed model is modally equivalent to M, w. We do so in two steps. First, we observe that for every v x,Y,n in W N that is not the root v, and every formula ϕ of modal depth at most
The proof is basically the same as in 1). Now, we can finally show that M, w is modally equivalent to N , v, i.e. that M, w ϕ iff N , v ϕ. We do so by induction over the complexity of ϕ. We only show the case, where ϕ is of the form Bψ. Before proceding to the proof of Theorem 1, we illustrate the construction in the first part of the above lemma with an example. 
Now, we can finally prove the soundness and completeness theorem.
Proof of Theorem 1 Soundness was shown in Observation 9 and Corollary 1 above. Now, we show the completeness of our axioms. Let ϕ be a belief formula that is valid on all epistemic frames. We have to show that MUD +X ϕ. Assume the contrary, i.e.
MUD +X ϕ and therefore by Lemma 1 there is a MUD ∞ model M on which ϕ is not valid. Thus, there is some w with M, w ¬ϕ. By Lemma 2, there is then an epistemic model N , v with N , v ¬ϕ. But this contradicts the assumption that ϕ is valid on the class of epistemic frames.
As already alluded to at the end of Sect. 2.1, a slight variation of the previous construction shows, that the axioms NEC, REG and D are sound and complete with respect to the first-order fragment of the belief language. 
Beyond MUD: model theory
We now take a closer look at the model theory of KT. 2 + EQ, and in particular at its relationship to epistemic models. To start with, we relate epistemic models to MUD neighborhood models. can we at least find some epistemic model N such that M is (equivalent to) the derived epistemic model of N ? As it turns out, the answer to both these questions is negative. In the remainder of this section we will show why.
First, we need to define when two models are equivalent. As usual, we will spell this out in terms of bisimulations. For neighborhood models, these are defined as follows [cf. Pacuit (2016) ].
Definition 5 Let M and N be monotonic neighborhood models and Z ⊆ M × N a relation. Then Z is a bisimulation iff, whenever w Z v:
• (Zig) For all X ∈ n(w) there is some X ∈ n(v) with ∀x ∈ X ∃x ∈ X such that x Z x . • (Zag) For all X ∈ n(v) there is some X ∈ n(w) with ∀x ∈ X ∃x ∈ X such that x Z x . We call Z bitotal iff for every x ∈ M there is some y ∈ N with x Z y and vice versa.
We recall that bisimilarity is, in general, a stricter notion than logical equivalence. In the case of Kripke frames, bisimilar models are logically equivalent, but the converse need not hold, see Blackburn et al. (2002, p.69) . The same holds true for neighborhood models, see Pacuit (2016) . The question we ask here is: Is every pointed MUD ∞ model M, w bisimilar to a derived neighborhood model N , v of an epistemic model?
We start by giving a sufficient condition for when a pointed MUD ∞ model M, w is bitotally bisimilar to the derived model N , v of an epistemic model. To do so, we extend the sequence of neighborhoods n i defined in the proof of Lemma 2 transfinitely. Recall, that 3
Since the n i form a decreasing sequence (i.e. n(w) ⊇ n 1 (w) ⊇ n 2 (w) . . .), a natural way of defining n ω is to take the intersection of all n i (w) for i < ω.
We can continue this construction arbitrarily, thus getting n α (w) for every ordinal α. Since the n α (w) form a ⊆-decreasing sequence, they must eventually reach a fixed point. Hence, there is some minimal ordinal α 0 such that n α 0 (w) = n α 0 +1 (w) for all w ∈ W . This n α 0 will help define the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a bitotal bisimulation between M, w and the derived model N , v of some epistemic model N , v. In the proof of Lemma 2, we showed that the n i (w) interpret the . . and instead of picking the v x,X such that X ∈ n i (x), we pick them such that X ∈ n α 0 (x). Then, the relation Z defined by x Zv y,Y iff x = y is a bitotal bisimulation. We now show that n α 0 (w ) = ∅ is also a necessary condition for being bitotally bisimilar to some derived model N , v of an epistemic model. We proceed in two steps. First, we show that in every KT. 2 + EQ model N , all n α 0 (w) are non-empty. In fact, R [v] ∈ n α 0 (w), where R is the relation corresponding to the K operator. As a second step, we show that if Z is a bisimulation between belief models M and N , then it is also a bisimulation between the belief models M i and N i , where the neighborhood functions n M and n N have been replaced by n i M and n i N , respectively. In particular, if x Z y then n i N (x) is empty iff n i M (y) is empty. We start with the first step. Let N , v be the derived model of an epistemic frame. We show by transfinite induction that
for all ordinals α (where R is the accessibility relation of the epistemic frame N ). For n 0 (w) = n(w), this holds true since R is reflexive. Now, assume α = β + 1 is a successor ordinal and R [v] Finally, as a second step, we show that if Z is a bisimulation between belief models M and N , then it is also a bisimulation between the belief models M α and N α , i.e. the models M and N where the neighborhood functions n M and n N are replaced by n α M and n α N . We do so by induction over α. Since n 0 (w) = n(w), the base case is trivial. Now, assume that α = β + 1 and that Z is a bitotal bisimulation between M β and N β . We have to show that Z is a bisimulation between M α and N α . The atomic harmony condition is trivial. We only show the (zig) condition. The proof of (zag) is similar. Thus let w Z v and X ∈ n α (w). To prove (zig), it is sufficient to show that Z [X ] = {v |x Zv for some x ∈ X } is in n α (v) . Note that by induction assumption,
. We have to show that there is some r ∈ Z [X ] ∩ Y with Y ∈ n β (r ). By definition ofn, there is some ϕ ∈n(v) with ϕ ⊆ Y . Thus we can assume without loss of generality that Y is of the form ϕ . Since w Z v, there is some Y ∈ n(w) such that for all y ∈ Y there is y ∈ Y with y Z y . Since Z is a bisimulation, M, y ϕ for every y ∈ Y . Thus Y ⊆ ϕ . In fact, since Z is bitotal, every y ∈ ϕ M has some y with y Z y . Using monotonicity, we can thus assume that Y = ϕ ∈n(w). Since X ∈ n α (w), there is some r ∈ X ∩ Y with Y ∈ n β (r ). Since Z is bitotal, there is some r with r Zr . Since Z is a bisimulation, we get r ∈ Y ∩ Z [X ]. The only thing that remains to show is that Y ∈ n β (r ). By assumption, Z is a bitotal bisimulation between M β and N β . Since Y ∈ n β (r ), there is some Y ∈ n β (r ) such that for all z ∈ Y there is z ∈ Y with z Z z . Thus, since Z is a bisimulation, Y ⊆ ϕ and thus by monotonicity Y = ϕ ∈ n β (r ). Finally, we show the claim for the case of α is a limit ordinal. Assume that X ∈ n α M (w). Again, it suffices to show that Z [X ] = {v |x Zv for some x ∈ X } ∈ n α N (v). Assume not. Then there is some β < α with X / ∈ n β N (v). Thus, since n β N is upward closed, there is no Z ∈ n β N (v) such that for all z ∈ Z ∃x ∈ X with x Z z. But this, together with the fact
, contradicts the induction assumption that Z is a bisimulation between M β and N β .
As mentioned above, the condition that all B i are valid in a MUD model M is equivalent to stating that n i (w) = ∅ for all i ∈ ω. For infinite models, this condition is weaker than demanding that n α 0 (w) = ∅. Since the former condition guarantees that M is modally equivalent to a K T.2 model [by Lemma 2 (2)], we conjecture:
Conjecture 1 There is an infinite pointed MUD ∞ model M, w, that is modally equivalent to some KT.2 model, but not bitotally bisimilar to the derived model N , v of any epistemic model.
Finally, we end with a quick note on the relationship between knowledge and belief. Within KT. 2 + EQ logic, belief is defined through knowledge via the equivalence (EQ): Bϕ ↔ K K ϕ. Thus, given an epistemic frame, we can read off the agents beliefs. But what about the converse? Assume we are given the corresponding derived belief model N , v of an epistemic model N , v. Can we retrieve the agents knowledge from N , v? As it turns out, the answer to this is again negative:
Example 2 There are two epistemic models M, v and N , x such that the derived belief models M , v and N , x are bisimilar, while there is some formula K ψ with M, v K ψ and N , x ¬K ψ.
Proof Let the neighborhood model O have as set of worlds W O = {w 1 , w 2 , w 3 }. The neighborhood function is constant (i.e. n(w 1 ) = n(w 2 ) = n(w 3 )) and given by n = {{w 1 , w 2 }, {w 1 , w 3 }, {w 1 , w 2 , w 3 }}. Finally V ( p) = {w 1 , w 2 }. It is easy to check that α 0 = 0, i.e. n(w) = n 1 (w) = n 2 (w) . . . for all w. Thus, by Theorem 2, there is an epistemic model M, v such that the corresponding belief model is bisimilar to O, w 1 . Furthermore, since {w 1 , w 2 } ∈ n α 0 (w), we can execute the construction from the proof of Theorem 2 in such a way, that the unique element of L 0 is labelled with v w 1 ,{w 1 ,w 2 } . Thus, every z ∈ M with v Rz is labelled with w 1 or w 2 , where R is the relation corresponding to the knowledge operator. Since V ( p) = {w 1 , w 2 }, this implies that M, v K p. Similarly, since {w 1 , w 3 } ∈ n α 0 (w), we can also construct N , x bisimilar to O, w 1 such that the unique element of L 0 is labelled with v w 1 ,{w 1 ,w 3 } .In this case, every z ∈ N with x Rz is labelled with w 1 or w 3 , and the latter label occurs at least once. Thus, N , x K p. Since the derived belief models of M, v and N , x are both bisimilar to O, w 1 , they are bisimilar to each other.
No lockean interpretation for belief
Having a sound and complete analysis of its logical structure, we now turn our attention to finding a suitable interpretation of the belief operator. Stalnaker, in his original paper, offers an understanding of the belief operator as "subjective certainty" on the side of the believing agent. This is in line with later probabilistic and Bayesian interpretations [see Fagin et al. (1999) , Klein and Pacuit (2014) and Galeazzi and Lorini (2016) ], where a KD45 theory of belief has been linked to the notion of belief with probability 4 1. In fact, KD45 is sound and complete with respect to belief with probability 1. So what about the belief operators introduced here? Do they lend themselves to a probabilistic interpretation? In the previous sections, we have introduced two new logics for knowledge and belief. The first of these, S −4 logic, combines a KT.2 notion of knowledge with the original Stalnaker axioms. In this logic, the resulting belief operator is still KD45 (Observation 8), thus we can maintain the interpretation of belief as probability 1 or, in Stalnaker's words, as subjective certainty.
Observation 13
The belief part of S −4 logic is sound and complete with respect to belief with probability 1.
The second logic we studied, combines a KT.2 knowledge operator with the identity Bϕ ↔ K K ϕ. As shown above, this belief operator is no longer a KD45 operator anymore. In fact, it is not even normal, as Bϕ ∧ Bψ → B(ϕ ∧ ψ) is not valid. Thus, the resulting belief will not be complete with respect to belief of probability 1. One tempting interpretation of the belief operator under consideration, motivated by the Lockean thesis (Leitgeb 2014) , is in terms of sufficiently high enough credence. That is, rather than demanding subjective certainty, a formula should be believed if its credence is above a given threshold t > 1/2, i.e.,
for some given probability measure p. It is well known that such an operator would not be closed under intersection. Moreover, such an operator would validate all axioms and rules of the first-order part of MUD +X logic.
Observation 14 NEC, REG and D are sound for B interpreted as "probability at least t", for any t > Proof Take a probability measure over a σ -algebra and let it be the set X of measurable sets that have probability > 1/2. It is immediately clear that X satisfies NEC and REG. To see that X satisfies D, let X and Y in X . Since p(X ) and p(Y ) are strictly greater than 0.5, we have X ∩ Y = ∅, showing that D holds.
NEC, REG and D, however, are not complete with respect to that interpretation. There are MUD ∞ models that cannot be equipped with a probability measure in such a way that the belief operator respects the equivalence above. We show in fact something stronger. Rather than focusing on a threshold of .5, we show that for any threshold there is some MUD ∞ model that cannot be equipped with a probability measure in such a way that the agent only believes propositions with probability at least . Even stronger still, the following example will be such that there is some proposition of low probability, at most , that the agent believes as well as some proposition of high probability, at least (1 − ), that the agent fails to believe.
Example 3 Assume a company advertises a new position. As it happens, n qualified candidates apply, so the company decides to make two hires. Assume now, that our agent just learned that two people will be hired, but he has not yet learned who. We will show that it is consistent with MUD +X to believe of each candidate simultaneously that she will be hired. But, of course, no matter how subjective credence is attributed to the different possible hires, some candidate needs to receive an extremely low subjective probability. Let us fill in some details.
The set of atomic propositions is p 1 , . . . p n , where p i stands for candidate i getting hired. We assume that there are at least 2 candidates, i.e. n ≥ 2. The model M = (W, n, V ) is then constructed as follows. The possible worlds are W = {w i, j |1 ≤ i < j ≤ n}. For the valuation, let w i, j ∈ V ( p k ) if k = i or k = j. Thus, world w i, j represents a situation in which agents i and j are hired. Finally, the neighborhood function n is constant (i.e. the same for all worlds) and given by the upward closure of { p 1 , . . . p n }. In particular, we have M Bp i for all i. Our agent believes of every candidate that they will be hired. Furthermore, M is a MUD ∞ model: The neighborhoods n are obviously monotonous and contain the unit. Since w i, j ∈ p i ∩ p j , also D holds, thus M is a MUD model. It is easy to check that n i (w) = n(w) for all i ∈ ω, thus also B i hold for all i.
So what about the subjective probabilities? As only two candidates are hired, not every p i can be assigned a high probability. If n is large enough, we are guaranteed to find some p i that receives a low probability, no matter how we choose to assign probabilities. To be somewhat more explicit about this argument, assume we want to find a probability function that makes each p i the agent believes as probable as possible. More specifically, we look for the probability distribution that maximizes min i pr ob( p i ); that is, we want to make the most improbable proposition that the agent still believes as probable as possible. It is not difficult to see that the probability distribution maximizing min i pr ob( p i ) assigns equal weight to all worlds. Since there are n(n−1) 2 many worlds, this probability distribution will assign a weight of 2 n(n−1) to every world w i j . All p i have cardinality n − 1, thus they each receive a weight of 2 n . Thus, in every possible probability distribution with n candidates, there will be some i such that p i has a subjective probability of at most 2 n . In particular, if n becomes large, the agent will believe some proposition p i that is extremely implausible, i.e. one to which she assigns probability at most 2 n . At the same time, she will not believe the proposition ¬ p i , even though it receives a credence of at least n−2 n .
The example shows that the notion of belief defined above is not sufficiently strong to enforce the "belief with high enough credence" interpretation. Now, a natural question to ask is: What additional constraints on beliefs would be required? We leave that question open for future work. Instead, we now inquire into a suitable interpretation of the B i operators defined in the last section.
In Sect. 2.2 we have introduced a sequence of belief operators B i ϕ, for all natural numbers i. These satisfy B j ϕ → B i ϕ for all j > i, thus imposing increasingly strict conditions on belief as i grows. In fact, each B j ϕ is defined by some (infinite) coherence conditions on the lower level B i . In other words, the lower level B i could be seen as an internal scaffolding, giving further structure to B j . Notably, we have shown that K ϕ → B i ϕ → Bϕ, i.e. B i is situated somewhere between belief simpliciter and knowledge. So, what is a reasonable interpretation of the B i ? Could they, perhaps, allow for a more knowledge-like interpretation? Or at least for an interpretation of belief with high probability? No. Despite being stronger operators, the logical properties of the B i are exactly the same as those of the B operators. In the following we denote by L B i the logical language, in which all B are replaced by B i . 
Conclusion: Inter-definability and higher-order consistency
Omitting positive introspection for knowledge in Stalnaker's system brings with it a number of surprises for the logic of belief. On the one hand, the interaction axioms in Table 2 (p. 3) are strong enough to keep the logic of belief unchanged, that is keep it to KD45, even in the absence of 4 for knowledge. This is not true if, instead of these interaction axioms, we take the definition of belief as the epistemic possibility of knowledge. Normality goes-belief no longer distributes over conjunction-together with introspection, either positive or negative. Not all introspective properties are lost, though. Agents, in that logic, never believe the Moore sentence about themselves. They never believe that something is the case but that they don't believe this. We have shown in fact that the agents are subjected to an infinite hierarchy of such anti-Moorean coherence constraints, and that this hierarchy completely axiomatizes this new logic of belief.
Compared to KD45, which as we saw in Sect. 3 is sound and complete with respect to the "probability 1" interpretation, the non-normal modal operator resulting from defining belief with (EQ) when knowledge is KT.2 is harder to interpret. In Sect. 3 we ruled out the Lockean reading. Could we then go back to viewing this belief operator as a formulation of "absolute subjective certainty" or even as the "mental component" of knowledge? The example developed in Sect. 3 shows that the absolute subjective certainty interpretation fails in the strongest way possible, at least if "certainty" is in any substantial way related to credences. The second reading goes back at least to Lenzen (1979) , who showed that in a slightly stronger doxastic-epistemic system, knowledge and belief become interdefinable; belief as the epistemic possibility of knowledge, and knowledge as true belief:
This equivalence fails already if knowledge is only S4. An inspection of the proof of Observation 4, however, reveals that in Stalnaker's system the logic of "true belief" is at least S4.2. So in that logic belief can be seen as the mental component of some epistemic-like attitude, although not of the primitive knowledge operator. Unsurprisingly, though, even this weaker result fails in KT. 2 + EQ. The logic of true belief will validate NEC, REG and, trivially, T, but not the full K axiom nor any introspective principle. So this belief is not the "mental component" of knowledge either, at least not of a common form of knowledge. The main philosophical output of this study of the belief fragment of KT. 2 + EQ is thus to turn the emphasis onto the higher-order consistency constraints that might bear on knowledge and belief, instead of adding yet another iteration to the debate on introspection. Mirroring that debate, though, an obvious question to ask is whether principles like "no belief in Moore sentence" (NBM) are prone to paradoxical consequences in cases of vagueness. A multi-agent extension of KT. 2 + EQ or MUD +X also raises interesting questions. In contrast to introspective properties, which most multi-agent epistemic logics assume to be common knowledge, it seems natural to allow uncertainty regarding (NBM). There is nothing paradoxical about believing a Moore sentence concerning someone else. The multi-agent perspective also raises interesting technical questions, as notions such as common belief become more subtle both to define and to axiomatize in the absence of full distribution under conjunction (Pacuit 2016) . Along the same line, an obvious next step is to develop a plausible theory of revision and update for weaker beliefs. Here the main challenge, this time echoing Özgün (2013) and Baltag et al. (2013) , would be to see whether-if not in general then when-information dynamically preserves the higher-order consistency constraints of MUD +X . All in all, then, omitting introspection from Stalnakers original system has turned out to be a technically rewarding enterprise, opening up interesting philosophical avenues.
Appendix-Proof theory for Stalnaker's system
In this appendix we present a version of Stalnaker's S in the setting of Display logic; which we shall call DS. This is interesting because this system is a bimodal logic and proof-theoretic investigations of such logics are still sparse.
Display logic has been designed by Belnap (1982) to provide for a powerful syntactic framework which is also a generalization of Gentzen's (1935) sequent calculus. Display logic allows for an elegant proof of cut elimination given that several conditions hold. These conditions are usually easy to verify. For this end the system contains not only formulas and sequents (also termed consecutions) but also structures. Due to its richness, however, there also downsides to Display logic, see e.g. Kracht (1996) . For connections to other logical frameworks cf. Ciabattoni et al. (2014) and Poggiolesi (2011) . Wansing (1998 Wansing ( , 2002 ) enriched Belnap's orignial work with an intensional marker •, in order to allows for a smooth formalization of normal modal logics within. For our purposes we introduce two bullets, one corresponding to knowledge, • K and one corresponding to belief,
In what follows we present a concise version of DS. We start with definitions of formulas and structures; throughout we use standard terminology as eg. in Wansing (1998) . The particular system DS consists of an axiom, structural and (propositional) logical rules, Display equivalence rules, and eventually rules for the introduction of the modalities K and B. A presentation of the system DS Axiom A ⇒ A Ais atomic.
Structural Rules
X ⇒ Y (I+)
This completes the presentation of DS. Here are three important derivations that illustrate how the system works.
The right counterparts of the structural rules P, C, and A are derivable.
Fact 3 DS ϕ ⇒ ϕ for all ϕ.
At the center of any Display logic is the Display theorem which is a main ingredient for establishing the cut elimination theorem. For this end we need two further definitions. It is not difficult to see that from these the Display theorem follows.
Definition 8 (Positive and negative occurrence) An occurrence of a substructure in a given structure is called positive if it is in the scope of an even number of * (otherwise it is coined negative). From the Display theorem together with the conditions (listed below) a general cut elimination result follows in a straightforward way. The conditions (C2)-(C8) guarantee cut elimination, whereas (C1) ensures the subformula property.
Definition 10 (Belnap's conditions (C1)-(C8))
(C1) Preservation of formulas Each formula occurring in a premise of a rule instance is a subformula of some formula in the conclusion (except Cut). (C2) Shape-likeness of parameters Congruent parameters are occurrences of the same structure. (C3) Non-proliferation of parameters Each parameter is congruent to at most one constituent in the conclusion; that is, no two constituents in the conclusion are congruent to each other. (1) or (2), or there is a derivation of (3) from the premises of Inf 1 and Inf 2 in which (Cut) is only used on proper subformulas of ϕ.
The following two theorems are direct consequences of the above definition.
Theorem 4 (Cut elimination for DS) Cut is eliminable for DS.
Let us pause to note that condition (C1) does not play a role in proving the eliminability of cut, i.e. conditions (C2) through (C8) are sufficient to prove the general cut elimination theorem. However, if all eight conditions do hold for a system, then it follows that the system possesses the subformula property meaning that each provable sequent has a proof where every formula occurring in any step of the derivation is a subformula of a formula in the conclusion.
Theorem 5 (Subformula property of DS) The display calculus DS without (Cut) has the subformula property.
We can in fact prove that if (1) S ϕ then DS I ⇒ ϕ and furthermore that (2) if DS X ⇒ Y , then D τ (X ) → τ (Y ). Part (2) needs an explicit treatment of the translation function τ , which is tedious but not particularly difficult. We omit it here.
Fact 4 DS and S are deductively equivalent.
This fact gives rise to soundness and completeness:
Fact 5 DS is sound and complete with respect to the semantics of S.
